POLINDEX 2023

Research Chair of Legislative Studies
University of Luxembourg

Research Note I - September 2023
Pre-Election Analysis based on Data by Age, Revenue, the Level of Education, Constituency, and Gender

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The POLINDEX 2023 study, dated 29th June 2023, has been the subject of a declaration to the Luxembourg Independent Audiovisual Authority (ALIA) under the Law of 14th December 2015 relating to public opinion surveys.
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The Context of the Study

The Political Observatory (POLINDEX) is a socio-political study conducted by the Chair of Legislative Studies of the University of Luxembourg (http://chaireparlementaire.uni.lu), commissioned by the Chambre des Députés du Luxembourg. Its aim is to establish the political and social state of Luxembourg, based on an annual survey carried out by the company ILRES S.A., in a comparative perspective with other European democracies (Germany, France, Italy and the UK). POLINDEX aims to report on an annual, non-partisan and scientific basis, on possible transformations in the individual and collective values (and their consequences in terms of social cohesion and political legitimacy) of Luxembourg citizens and foreign residents in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The aim is to obtain research results relating to relationships with democracy, institutions, and civil society organizations, and to build up a socio-cultural, socio-economic, and socio-political database on the determinants of voting, political behaviour and social representations, in order to improve decision-making in Luxembourg and Europe. The questionnaire in German, English, French and Luxembourgish is downloadable POLINDEX 2023 - Luxembourg Independent Audio-visual Authority (ALIA).

Theoretical Framework

The questionnaire was constructed according to three fundamental theoretical models in political sociology a) The study of cleavages according to the model of American political scientist Seymour M. LIPSET and Norwegian political scientist Stein ROKKAN1; b) Individuation according to the model of Swiss analytical psychologist Carl Gustav JUNG2; c) The materialist/post-materialist relationship according to the model of American sociologist Ronald INGLEHART3. More precisely, with economic development, individuals attach less importance to material security and gradually embrace values that emphasize a sense of belonging, individual autonomy, and self-expression. These values spread with the turnover of generations, on the assumption that the basic structure of personality tends to crystallize in youth and change little thereafter. Individuals born into a society of (at least relative) abundance therefore naturally adhere to post-materialist values, and end up taking the place of older, materialistic generations who gradually disappear. This thesis is underpinned by

evolutionary optimism. As economic development becomes more widespread, post-materialist values, and with them the democratic values associated with them (since the need for self-expression and individual autonomy are antinomic to political authoritarianism), should spread throughout Western societies.

Moreover, with economic development, individuals would place less importance on material security and gradually adopt values that emphasize the feeling of belonging, individual autonomy and self-expression. These so-called “post-materialist” values would spread with the renewal of generations, based on the principle that the basic structure of the personality tends to crystallize in youth and to evolve little thereafter. Individuals born and living in a society of abundance would adhere to “post-materialist” values and would end up cohabiting with often older generations, driven by so-called “materialist” values, expressing their greater support for economic growth, welfare state public policies and principles of authority. With the generalization of economic development, "post-materialist" values, and with them the democratic values associated with them (since the need for expression and individual autonomy are antithetical to political authoritarianism), should spread in Western societies.

Ultimately, the autonomy of the subject characterizing demo-liberal society would subsequently generate individuation, i.e., the process in which one considers themselves as “a world”. The individual’s actions and their references are both the object of their will and their ability to live according to the strength of his imagination. Moreover, their behaviours and desires can no longer have limits set by normative and/or legislative principles assumed collectively and/or by public power. The common narrative in politics and in all other areas would be replaced by the self-narrative, consumerism and “egocracy”, facilitated by new technologies and artificial intelligence.

**Operationalisation**

From an operational point of view, the ILRES MyPanel is the basis of the survey. It currently has 17,000 members. Recognised both nationally and internationally, considering its size, it can be used to carry out representative surveys of the resident population using the CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interview) system. The profile variables used in setting up the initial sample were age, gender, region of residence, nationality, and professional activity (yes vs. no). The distribution of residents according to these variables is done in accordance with the official statistics of the STATEC (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg) each year. The 1,500 people surveyed (1,000 Luxembourgish citizens and 500 foreigner residents), paid between 10 and 15 euros, answered a questionnaire lasting between 30-40 minutes, comprising 80 questions in German, English, French and Luxembourgish (based on a choice of preference).
### Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The interviews were conducted online via ILRES' MyPanel</td>
<td>A sample of 1058 voters and 500 foreign residents was drawn</td>
<td>Du 6 juin au 20 juin 2023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ponderation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Luxembourgish</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48.83%</td>
<td>51.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51.17%</td>
<td>48.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>12.66%</td>
<td>6.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>17.16%</td>
<td>21.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>14.48%</td>
<td>24.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>14.64%</td>
<td>20.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>16.79%</td>
<td>14.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>24.27%</td>
<td>11.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lux-ville</td>
<td>11.15%</td>
<td>30.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of centre</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
<td>15.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>39.28%</td>
<td>33.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
<td>12.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>14.16%</td>
<td>8.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The samples were weighted separately based on statistics received in April 2023 from STATEC. The median duration of the questionnaire was 44 minutes.

### Sample Obtained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Luxembourgish</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lux-ville</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of centre</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of invitations sent: 5975. Number of people who clicked on the link: 2337 (67% completed the survey, 16% interrupted it, and 17% were eliminated).
List of Political Groups

- Communist Party of Luxembourg (PCL-KPL)
- The Left (Déi Lénk)
- The Greens (Déi Gréng)
- Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (POSL-LSAP)
- Democratic Party (PD-DP)
- VOLT Luxembourg (VOLT Lëtzebuerg)
- Christian Social People’s Party (PCS-CSV)
- Focus (Fokus)
- Democratic Reform Party (ADR)
- Freedom (Fräiheet)
- The Conservatives (Déi Konservativ)
- Pirate Party of Luxembourg (PPL-Piraten)

Reading Note

Although the POLINDEX survey addressed both Luxembourgish citizens and non-citizen residents, this analysis only includes the political body that will vote in the elections on 8th October 2023, i.e., the citizens.

The results regarding the voters of Fokus, Volt, the Luxembourg Communist Party or other political groups, although they are present among the answers, are not mentioned in this first research note, since they did not prove to be statistically representative.

When we discuss the “main vote” or the “partisan electorate”, it describes the voters’ intention to vote for the entire list presented by a party and/or a political movement, or that they would only grant their preferential votes to some of the candidates of the party list. This concerns 69% of the Luxembourgish electorate.
Socio-Political Landscape Prior to the National Elections on 8th October 2023

As revealed by the POLINDEX 2023 study, Luxembourg’s political sphere confronts a multitude of challenges. These issues, as encapsulated below, represent a mosaic of factors which help us understand the Grand Duchy’s socio-political landscape before the parliamentary elections on 8th October 2023.

Political Challenges

POLINDEX 2023 findings outline a set of political challenges in Luxembourg, such as rising concerns regarding housing, the facets of demographic and economic development and their concomitant impacts. Within the economic sphere, the nexus between inflationary pressures and the consequential fluctuations in purchasing power commands attention, just as the exigency of addressing climate change. The protracted war in Ukraine casts a considerable geopolitical shadow on Luxembourgish citizens (see chart below). Lastly, the ongoing discourse surrounding the political involvement of foreign nationals in the national elections continue to raise questions and debates about representation and inclusivity.

![Degré d'inquiétude par rapport à la guerre en Ukraine](chart_image)

- **Des conséquences économiques de la guerre**
  - Très inquiet: 34
  - Plutôt inquiet: 53
  - Plutôt pas inquiet: 8
  - Pas du tout inquiet: 2
  - Je ne sais pas / Pas de réponse: 4

- **D’une possible extension du conflit au-delà de l’Ukraine**
  - Très inquiet: 30
  - Plutôt inquiet: 47
  - Plutôt pas inquiet: 14
  - Pas du tout inquiet: 5
  - Je ne sais pas / Pas de réponse: 4

- **Des conséquences financières de la guerre pour vous-même et votre foyer**
  - Très inquiet: 27
  - Plutôt inquiet: 45
  - Plutôt pas inquiet: 20
  - Pas du tout inquiet: 4
  - Je ne sais pas / Pas de réponse: 4
Challenges Related to Voting

Observations regarding the relationship with the Government conclude a divided partisan electorate. The electorate is characterised by cleavages, both along partisan delineations and thematic questions. The study found that the working classes (lowest incomes and lowest education levels) are the most undecisive regarding their political preferences, while the age group of 45-54 is currently the most dissatisfied with the outgoing Government as well as with the economic situation. Voting preferences are formulated based on convictions (fundamental principles and alignment with the vision of the chosen party) and institutional preferences (the wish for the preferred party to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies). We also found significant disparities between the Southern and the Central constituencies in terms of both socio-political structures and values.

Concerns Related to Values

POLINDEX 2023 findings show a stable public confidence in democracy, but a decline regarding the relationship between the citizens and the institutions of representative democracy, e.g., the trust in democratic institutions and the general interest in politics. The shift towards materialistic preferences, coupled with the process of individualisation, outline changing societal values. The shift towards materialist preferences, associated with the process of individualization and individuation, underlines the evolution of societal values which might contribute to a political and even more pluralist recomposing in the political formations.

The analysis focuses on six dimensions of the POLINDEX 2023 results, putting an emphasis on the fact that the POLINDEX 2023 Survey was conducted a few months before the Grand Duchy’s national elections on 8th October 2023. These dimensions are socio-demographic dynamics, voting intentions, the motivations behind voting preferences, emotions vis-à-vis politics, the status of the national economy, and the relationship between the electoral body and the outgoing Government.
I Socio-Demographic Dynamics

The cultural, economic, and social transformation in Luxembourg continues compared to the legislative elections of 2018. The society of abundance is strengthened both by the progression in the level of monthly income available per household and by the dominant self-definition among voters of the middle social class. For the first time since 1999, the employment structure is almost balanced between the public and private sectors. Secularization is accelerated compared to 2018. For the first time, the Catholic religion is no longer the majority in terms of social identification. Densifying urbanization in the South and Centre means that these two constituencies shall be considered as determining considering the possible dynamics of voting preferences in the 2023 national elections. On the other hand, the social structure by age and level of education has changed little compared to 2018. Note that more than a third of the electorate has a second nationality. In 2023, Luxembourg’s electorate is still the oldest in the European Union (more than 40% are aged over 55).

In 2023, the oldest partisan electorate are the socialists. The share of the oldest voters increased compared to 2018 among the Greens (+5 points on average in the two oldest age groups) but the composition of the Christian Social electorate became slightly younger (particularly, among the 18-24 as well as the 25–34-year-old group by +3 points, who, as the table below shows, are also one of the largest age groups.)
Luxembourg’s electorate has the highest average monthly income per household available in the European Union: more than 35% have incomes above 6,001 euros.

The society of abundance characterised by the growing share of the highest incomes in the electorate would primarily benefit the Liberals. However, Christian Social voters appear to have the average income that best corresponds to the average salary in the country (see table below).
The structuring by social class clearly shows that the largest segment (more than 43%) of Luxembourg’s electorate self-defines as part of the middle classes. Furthermore, more than 20% consider themselves upper middle class.

At the party level, we note an over-representation of the lower middle classes among the ADR electorate, as well as the fact that the Greens and the DP have the most voters to self-define as members of the upper middle class (see the table below).
We also observe a rebalancing between the share of voters working in the private sector and those in the public and parapublic sector, to the benefit of the former. For the first time since 1999, the public and parapublic sector is no longer in the majority (only 46%). The increase in the importance of the private sector has been constant since 2013.

As the table below shows, the socialist partisan electorate is the most dependent on public and parapublic employment in Luxembourg, as 60% are part of this sector. On the other hand, the partisan electorate closest to the statistical reality of Luxembourg is the voters of the CSV.
Our study concludes that the share of the electorate which has only completed primary or secondary education is 50%. While this represents a decrease of 5% compared to 2018, the considerable share of this segment of the electorate remains one of the keys to understanding the election on 8th October 2023, especially due to its over-representation in the North and the South. This group also displays higher levels of indecision one week before the election.
Voters who have only completed upper secondary education are the most numerous in the electorate in 2023. They are the most willing to vote primarily for the CSV and secondarily for the LSAP, but as the chart below shows, are also the most hesitant.

The share of the electorate in the Southern constituency has never been so preponderant: 40% of voters said they lived there. Altogether, two thirds of voters are concentrated in the South and Center constituencies. The new relationship with residential and working space and its growing concentration in these regions outlines the most acute questions which concern Luxembourgish society, such as housing.
Our study observes a concentration of partisan voters for the LSAP in the South. It is also in this constituency with the most responses of “no answer” and “I don’t know” regarding their principal vote. Liberal votes may come mainly from the Centre. Once again, the Christian Social electorate can be distinguished by the highest average votes in each of the four constituencies.
In 2023, 35% of the Grand Duchy’s electorate has another nationality. The study also shows that more than 40% of the liberal partisan electorate holds a dual nationality (see chart below). A link could be established between the registration of Luxembourgers living abroad in the given constituency and the possible strength of the liberal vote.

Women constitute 50.75% of Luxembourg’s electorate. Women are over-represented among undecided voters (answers of “I don't know”). For the first time since 1999, Déi Gréng has a heavily male electorate (up to 60%). On the contrary, Déi Lénk attracts the most female partisan voters in Luxembourg (more than 55%).
Even though Christian churches are still in the majority as a religious and/or philosophical identification, Catholics are no longer in the majority for the first time in the history of Luxembourg since its Christianisation. The share of atheists has also declined (-5%) compared to 2018. New forms of spirituality and refusal to answer have both increased by more than 3 points since 2018.
A cultural reference to Catholicism remains strong among the Christian Social electorate, while we observe a strong reference to agnosticism and atheism among the voters of the Socialists and the Greens (more pronounced than in 2018 among the latter).
II Feelings about Politics: The Overall Satisfaction with Democracy Accompanied by Distrust in Politics

The findings of the POLINDEX 2023 survey confirm that democracy is solid in Luxembourg compared to neighbouring countries, as 70% of respondents are very or quite satisfied with the functioning of democracy. However, we witness a loss of 14% regarding satisfaction compared to the results of ELECT 2018.

It is crucial to note that for the first time since 1999, the dominant feeling about politics is distrust, while the second and third most important sentiments are interest and hope. While distrust characterises most groups in our analysis, the level of interest and/or hope differs remarkably in the specific groups of the electorate.
Data suggest that the structure of distrust in different segments of the electorate may benefit the Socialist Party, as well as parties more to the right and/or those which have never held a ministerial function before.

The above two charts show the structure of the three most prominent feelings by age groups and by groups of educational level. Regarding the level of education, findings show that distrust dominates in all groups except for citizens with a master or degree, in which groups interest is the most important sentiment regarding politics. It is noteworthy that a hopeful
sentiment about politics is relatively high among the youngest (18-24) and oldest (65+) age groups, however, the level of distrust reaches beyond 50% in both the 45-54 and 55-64 age groups. The prominence of the sentiment of hope among the youngest age groups may benefit parties which have not held governmental responsibilities before. Based on the survey’s results, the Christian Social Party, currently in opposition, appears to be the most popular among the predominantly distrustful electorates of secondary education level, which provides them a further advantage.

In addition, findings outline a **high level of distrust in the North and the South compared to the Centre and Luxembourg City**. More than a third of voters in the North are distrustful of politics. Voters in this constituency are also among the most critical on issues presented by the survey. Regarding the composition of feelings by sex, findings show that **women are more suspicious, less interested, less hopeful, but more respectful about politics than men**. Regarding the level of monthly income, we conclude that the group of the highest income level (6001-8000 euros per month) displays more interest in politics than distrust. It is also the segment of the electorate (by revenue) which is the most hopeful.
A further challenge for democracy in Luxembourg is the citizens’ strong perception of a distance between the interests and opinions of the citizens and the representatives. As the chart below shows, voters of most of the political parties believe that politicians are not truly preoccupied with what people think. This particularly worrisome result can be outlined in all the different partisan electorates.
III Understanding Voting Intentions in October 2023

The survey observes a complex social structure which prevents the clear visibility of the main vote by political party. The three most popular parties of 2018 appear to be rather stable but with potential bonus votes for the LSAP and for the parties which have not held a ministerial function before.

The above chart depicts the order of political parties according to popularity as shown by our research. Based on the responses, CSV is the most preferred party (22%), followed by LSAP and DP, head-to-head (15% preference for each). However, a remarkable segment of the electorate appears to be hesitant regarding their vote, especially in the South and in Luxembourg City, and in the groups of society with lower educational levels (48% of the citizens with only primary education did not choose their party of preference).

The oldest groups of the electorate show preference mainly towards the LSAP and the CSV. It is worth noting that the electorate of environmentalist preference is also aging compared to 2018. Voters who have completed only secondary cycle are the most numerous in the electorate in 2023 and the most willing to vote for the Christian Social Party. However, this group of the electorate is characterised by remarkable hesitance regarding voting preferences.

While the most popular party among women is the CSV, it is important to note that 26% of women are indecisive regarding which party to give their votes on 8th October 2023, which is higher than the overall average.
The study observes that the partisan electorates (main vote) of the parties of the outgoing Government are those who will also cast the most mixed votes (including both intra- and inter-list voting). It is the voters of the Democratic Party who show the most tendency for “panachage” for candidates of other parties. Conversely, the partisan electorates (main vote) of the current parties in opposition would predominantly vote for the entire list which reveals both the role of conviction (fundamental principles, values) and voting for institutional considerations (the wish for their party of preference to be member of the future Government and/or Parliament with more deputies). As the following charts show, the voters of the ADR prefer list-voting the most.
It is in the Centre constituency where the willingness of inter-list voting (choosing candidates from other lists) appears to be strongest. The outlined structure of inter-list voting dynamics may benefit the Liberals, followed by the CSV, not only in the said constituency, which is the second in number of voters, but also at the national level. Voting for the entire list largely dominates in the South which should, by the weight it represents, benefits firstly, LSAP, and secondly, CSV.
Regionally speaking, firstly, the DP voters who prefer inter-list voting display very distinct preferences. More specifically, towards the CSV candidates in the Centre, towards the LSAP candidates in the South, which means the further strengthening of the position of the Socialists in the South. Secondly, Socialist voters show willingness to distribute votes to both Liberals and Christian Social candidates in the Southern constituency. This points out the formulation of two distinct socialist electorates in the South from now on: one more concerned with social and materialist policies which would also vote for the CSV candidates, and a second one which is more committed to cultural liberalism and post-materialism, voting more for DP candidates. Thirdly, Christian Social supporters in the South would distribute votes mainly for candidates of the Democratic Party by inter-list voting. It must also be considered that the reserve of votes coming from the CSV for the DP candidates would be less strong than that of voters from the DP to the CSV, as the former would vote in majority by list vote while the latter would vote in greater numbers by inter-list vote.

The following four charts show the structure of partisan voting preferences.
Panacheurs libéraux dans le Sud

- Autres partis
- Parti pirate du Luxembourg (PPL)
- Parti réformateur démocrate (ADR)
- Parti chrétien social (CSV)
- Parti démocratique (DP)
- Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois (LSAP)
- Les Verts (Déi Gréng)
- La Gauche (Déi Lénk)

Panacheurs libéraux dans le Centre

- Autres partis
- Parti pirate du Luxembourg (PPL)
- Parti réformateur démocrate (ADR)
- Parti chrétien social (CSV)
- Parti démocratique (DP)
- Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois (LSAP)
- Les Verts (Déi Gréng)
- La Gauche (Déi Lénk)
- Parti Communiste du Luxembourg (PCL)

E2d: Question 180: E2d. Pour quels autres partis allez-vous voter ? Parti démocratique (DP)
Les partis politiques présents dans la première moitié de la page comprennent:

- La Gauche (Déi Lénk)
- Les Verts (Déi Gréng)
- Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois (LSAP)
- Parti démocratique (DP)
- Parti chrétien social (CSV)
- Parti réformateur démocrate (ADR)
- Parti pirate du Luxembourg (PPL)
- Parti chrétien social luxembourgeois (CSV)
- Parti réformateur démocrate (ADR)
- Parti pirate du Luxembourg (PPL)
- Parti communiste du Luxembourg (PCL)

Les partis politiques présents dans la deuxième moitié de la page comprennent:

- Les Verts (Déi Gréng)
- Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois (LSAP)
- Parti démocratique (DP)
- Parti chrétien social (CSV)
- Parti réformateur démocrate (ADR)
- Parti pirate du Luxembourg (PPL)
- Parti communiste du Luxembourg (PCL)

Les partis politiques mentionnés et non mentionnés sont représentés dans les diagrammes de barres ci-dessus.
The three major parties of the last national elections may win the most votes on 8th October 2023 due to their over-representation in certain social categories (see table below). The social structure/voting intentions ratio can provide for stability compared to the 2018 elections regarding the CSV, the DP, and the LSAP, with relatively minor losses or gains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTING STRUCTURE &amp; PARTY BENEFITS</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>REVENUE</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>REGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSAP has the best perception in all age groups</td>
<td>DP is the most popular party among the highest income earners, and this group is also growing</td>
<td>CSV over-representation among electorates with secondary level education and below</td>
<td>LSAP strength in the country's first constituency: the South</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties new to the parliament and / or governmental responsibilities according to the preference of the young electorate</td>
<td>CSV has the best average in all income categories</td>
<td>DP over-representation among the citizens with the highest levels of education</td>
<td>DP strength in the Centre constituency and Luxembourgers abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSV and LSAP because they are the most numerous in the 44–54-year-old age group worried by the current economic situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parties new to the parliament and / or governmental responsibilities because of a more important vote for them in the South and in the North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV Understanding the Reasons Behind Voting Preferences

Institutional and conviction-based voting to explain voting preferences in the national elections of October 2023

When asked about specific motivations based on which citizens decide which party they will vote for in the national elections of October 2023, the questionnaire offered a list of reasons of both “institutional” and “conviction-based” types. Among answers of institutional character, the questionnaire offered, for instance, the satisfaction if a party gets elected to the government and / or the Parliament. Among the convictional options, the questionnaire listed more value-based reasons, such as personal alignment with the values that the party represents, the programme of the party, and having trust in the candidates of the party.

As the chart below shows, several motivations in both categories received in majority a positive answer from the respondents. The two main motivations, both of institutional nature, are the personal satisfaction if the given political party gets elected to the Chamber of Deputies and the Government. The third, fourth, and fifth most prominent options are based on the personal convictions and resonance with the values of the party (thus, “conviction-
based”), with its electoral programme, and the trust in the candidates. However, findings also show that the personal proximity to the political parties (e.g., personally being active in the party or knowing persons active in the party) is not in the forefront of electoral preference formulation. It is also noteworthy that a remarkable segment of respondents answered “I do not know” to the option of being convinced by the electoral campaign.

Along the two types of motivations defined above, the findings outline the electoral advantage of and voting stability for the three major parties of the elections of 2018: CSV, LSAP, and DP. These three parties benefit from the composition of voting motivations, as findings show, as all three enjoy the preference of the citizens based on both institutional and conviction-based motivations. Findings by age groups confirm the above general observation, providing for a second advantage for the three most popular parties of the elections of 2018.

Based on the POLINDEX survey, preference for DP, LSAP, and CSV is present in each age group. However, voting preference for the Christian Social People’s Party based on institutional considerations is found to be more prominent among men than women. Findings also show that the Democratic Party enjoys further conviction-based advantage in the group of citizens with the highest educational levels as well as the highest revenue, especially because we can witness the augmentation of the latter group in the society. The most educated (master and doctorate) are over-represented regarding the emphasis on the correspondence between personal convictions and the basic principles of the parties.
As the chart above shows, the two youngest age groups are the most likely to view politics from a utilitarian perspective and are the most sensitive to a successful electoral campaign. Furthermore, these two age groups showed the highest level of consideration of personal gains and interest as well as of preference for the selected party to become a member of the Chamber of Deputies. The groups of 45-54 and 55-64 are the most prone to formulate voting preferences in protest to the actual coalition, while the two youngest age groups are the least characterized by the latter. Personal affiliation with the party of preference is the most important for the oldest age group.

**V Economic Concerns**

A rather stable standard of living, but one third considers that the standard of living has deteriorated (+10 points compared to 2018)
We can witness once again a clear distinction between the Centre and the South, with a perceived degradation of 26% and 40%, respectively.

As we see on the above chart, while well-being is the most dominant feeling about the standard of life, distrust and weariness follows closely. Regarding the specific groups of the analysis, the study observes the following. 1) Deterioration in the Luxembourgish economy is strongly expressed by all income categories. 2) None of the electoral groups consider the current economic situation identical or better than the past year by a majority. 3) The electorate of the Centre is much less distrustful than in the South (respectively 23% and 35%). 4) A striking 44% of the lower middle class are distrustful. 5) Proportionally, it is the 45–54-year-old voters who assess the economic situation in the most negative way. 6) Nearly 30% of
voters in the South and the North as well as 25% in the East assess the economic situation “much less good”. 7) Women are less satisfied with the current economic situation. The emergence of these economic concerns can benefit all current opposition parties.

According to respondents, the three most urging issues that Luxembourg is facing (in order) are housing (69%), maintaining purchasing power and inflation (43%), and environment and climate change (38%). While housing and the purchasing power are considered prominent struggles by all age-groups, environmental questions engage the most citizens in the 65+, the 55-64, and the 18-24 groups. Furthermore, the seven most important challenges further include health, social security, and care for the elderly (36%), pensions (29%), the security and well-being of citizens (28%), and taxation (27%).

It is important to highlight that according to the respondents, none of the political parties appears to be able to tackle the three most important challenges in 2023.
The above chart shows the most positive (but overall, not dominant) perception about the Christian Social People’s Party, followed by LSAP and DP. It is important to note that a large segment (36%) does not have a clear view about the question or believes that none of these parties may be able to solve the primary challenges in the country.
VI The Assessment of the Outgoing Government

The record of the outgoing government still receives a positive assessment, precisely, 5.6 on a 1-10 scale. The average was however 7.2 in 2018, therefore the findings show a slight decline.

The approval of the outgoing Government is in majority among the electorate in most age groups. The category with the lowest level of approval are voters between 45-54. This result is not surprising given that, as shown before, this group is also the most prone to vote in protest to the actual Government, the group which is most critical about the economic situation, and one of the two groups where distrust reaches beyond 50%.
In addition, POLINDEX 2023 concludes that the higher the level of education, the stronger the support for the current government. Regarding the approval of the Government by monthly income available to the household, we observe that those with an income over 6,000 euros per month and above are the most positive about the actions of the outgoing government. By electoral constituency, the City of Luxembourg and the Centre are the main fortresses of support for the current Government.

However, housing policy is weakening the outgoing government, with 77% of voters believing that it has failed to develop effective public policies in this area. One must keep it in mind that housing was the priority concern during the 2018 national elections, and it was also the most important issue for the citizens. This may have influence on the outcome of the 2023 national elections.
Conclusive Remarks

The social structure of Luxembourg has become considerably more complex over the last ten years, helping to erase the historical geographical socio-political and socio-cultural divisions which allowed political parties to retain voters in the different constituencies. Partisan electorates are less and less concentrated, except for a dominant socialist vote in the South and a liberal vote in the Centre.

New divisions, far from being based on discriminating normative references such as religion, equality or social cohesion, identity, immigration, or ecology – as was the case until the mid-2000s – now appear to be more linked to the level of education, monthly household income, psycho-political status (“enthusiastic” or “distrustful” about politics depending on the individual’s position in Luxembourgish society), sedentary lifestyle and/or social mobility, as well as the growing segment of the electorate working in the private sector.

The new markers of the Luxembourgish electorate seem to lead to a revival of “materialist” rather than “post-materialist” values. Among the seven priorities most cited by voters, six are clearly identifiable with materialism: housing, purchasing power, inflation, health, pensions, security and taxation. Only one post-materialist theme, the environment and climate change, is still very present among voters. This “materialist” evolution of the Luxembourg body politic, more pronounced than in 2013 and 2018, could be linked to a social structure which is characterised by strong growth in the share of the voters with the highest incomes (the highest of Europe), by the rise of the share of the Luxembourgish citizenry affiliated with the private sector, by the continued presence of less educated social groups who are more concerned about their economic situation in the post-pandemic period as well as the war in Ukraine and its economic consequences, and the existence of real or perceived inequalities in terms of economic development, housing, and security, depending on the constituency.

Along with the Scandinavian countries, confidence in Luxembourg’s democracy remains the highest on average among Council of Europe member states. However, distrust of politics is now the main feeling. One week before the election, more than a third of voters have not yet chosen their main voter, and confidence in resolving the most salient problems is no longer placed primarily in political parties. More respondents declared “don’t know” and “none of these parties” than for the first party considered to be the most competent in terms of the socio-economic context, i.e., the Christian Social People’s Party.

However, distancing or differentiating oneself from politics is not the majority. Furthermore, due to the affluent society that characterises Luxembourg, the outgoing Government still benefits from majority approval for its actions during its mandate. These actions are considered positive in all areas, except for the question of housing and the past, present and future management of Luxembourg’s economic development – further proof of a shift in the electorate towards materialism.

Undecided voters appear to be the most numerous among female voters, citizens of the North and South of Luxembourg, and those whose income and level of education are the lowest.
These are also the social categories that are the most critical or indifferent towards politics, but still without comparison with the situation in Germany, France and/or Belgium.

Ultimately, POLINDEX 2023 cannot be a voting aid instrument, a preferential analytical framework any possible government coalition or predictability as to the results of the national elections on 8th October 2023. After the production of 800 pages of detailed analyses (frequency-based, cross-referenced, and regression model-based analyses) during the summer period of 2023, in this first research note our objective is to highlight the fact that the society of abundance in Luxembourg in no way prevents us from identifying disjointed political behaviour in the future between the Centre and Southern constituencies, between the more affluent (increasingly numerous) and the less economically advantaged, the least and most educated, between the oldest in the society (who still constitute the first electoral group and are more attached to normative references such as the quality of life and the environment) and the median group, i.e., 34-55 years old, who are more concerned about their personal economic situation and that of Luxembourg, both in the present and in the future.

On the other hand, all groups in our analysis display, firstly, dynamics of institutional voting preference, i.e., the wish to see their preferred party become a member of the Government and/or Parliament. Secondly, conviction-based voting shall be considered equally important: the vote of preference is constructed by personal values as well as principles put forward by parties and electoral programmes. 68% of citizens are still interested in Politics, suggesting, firstly, new political realignments through the prism of a complex social structure and materialism. Secondly, a partial redistribution of seats in Parliament between political groups which contribute to democratic functioning in the Grand Duchy under the watchful eye of the fellow citizens, especially the youngest among us.
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